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Abstract—We construct a modular scheme which extends codes
for wiretap channels of type I for use in wiretap channels
of type II. This is done by using a concatenate and permute
strategy, wherein multiple uses of the wiretap type I code are
concatenated and then the joint sequence of symbols permuted.
The choice of permutation is then encoded with a short code and
appended to the transmitted sequence. Analysis shows essentially
no degradation in operational parameters (rate, error rate,
leakage) for the new code over the wiretap type II channel when
compared to those of multiple uses of the original code over the
wiretap type I channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1], and later Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2], first studied
the wiretap channel of type I, which is a model of the com-
munication scenario where an encoder wants to send private
information to a decoder in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Specifically, Wyner considered the discrete memoryless case,
where the channel from encoder to eavesdropper was a de-
graded version of the channel from encoder to decoder, while
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner considered a slightly more general model
which included the case where the channel from encoder
to eavesdropper no longer need be degraded. In both cases,
the statistical descriptions of both channels were fixed and
known by all parties. The result of the analysis determined
the maximum bits per symbol at which an encoder could send
the information, and still have the mutual information per bit
between the message and the eavesdropper’s observation be
small.
Of course, this model does not accurately reflect real world
scenarios; it is unlikely for the channel from encoder to
eavesdropper to be known by the encoder, since learning
a channel generally requires cooperation from both parties.
For this reason, alternative wiretap channel models were
formulated, this time with some amount of ambiguity on
the part of the encoder about the channel from encoder to
eavesdropper. The wiretap channel of type II, introduced by
Ozarow and Wyner [3], is one such model. In the original
wiretap channel of type II, the channel from encoder to
decoder could be used to perfectly send any length-n, n ∈ Z+,
sequence, but the eavesdropper could perfectly observe any
k, 0 < k < n, symbols of their choice. Here the ambiguity
entered by way of the encoder not knowing which of the
symbols the eavesdropper would choose.
Recently, Nafea and Yener [4], [5] generalized the wiretap
channel of type II by allowing the channel from the encoder
to decoder to be noisy, and allowing multiple noisy channels
from encoder to eavesdropper which, for every symbol, the
eavesdropper may select to use up to a set number of times.
Once again, this model was thought to be closer to a real-
istic scenario since the encoder is not allowed to know the
eavesdropper’s choice of channel (instead only which channels
are possible, and the number of times that channel could be
chosen) a priori. Not long after the new model had been
proposed, Goldfeld et al. [6] determined the semantic secrecy
capacity for the case where the channels from the encoder
to eavesdropper are either perfect or convey no information.
Their result stands primarily as a demonstration of the power
of Cuff’s [7] soft-covering lemma. Similar results for the more
general wiretap channel of type II were also obtained for
strong secrecy by He et al. [8] and by Nafea and Yener [5].
The purpose of our work is to demonstrate that nearly
any code for the wiretap channel of type I has a modular
extension for wiretap channels of type II. In other words, it
is somewhat unnecessary to design a purpose built code for a
wiretap channel of type II: codes for the wiretap channel type
I will suffice with some minor modification. It also suggests
that most results for the wiretap channel of type I directly
extend to a wiretap channel of type II. To do this we exploit
the fact the eavesdropper must choose their state sequence
independently of the message. This exploitation comes in the
form of applying Ahlswede’s [9] “robustification process” to
multiple uses of a wiretap channel type I code, while sending
the randomization used for the robustification via a shorter
code. Doing so, the robustification process removes the ability
for the eavesdropper to correlate their channel state selection
with the code in a meaningful way. The only degradation in the
operational parameters comes in that the wiretap type I code
had to be used multiple times. Comparing the new wiretap
channel type II code to multiple uses of the wiretap channel
type I code sees nearly equivalent measures of operation.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
A. Notation
Random variables, constants, and sets will be written with
upper case, lower case, and script respectively. For example
X may take on value x ∈ X . Xnj will be used to denote the
sequence of random variables Xj , Xj+1, . . . , Xn. If j = 1,
the subscript will be omitted. Similar notation will be used to
denote sequences of constants and sets.
P(X ) will be used to denote the set of all probability
distributions on a discrete set X , similarly P(Y|X ) will be
used to denote the set of conditional probability distributions
on Y given an element in X . Next Pn(X ) denotes the set of
all possible empirical distributions over Xn. Here an empirical
distribution of a sequence is the normalized count of symbol
occurrence. For instance, the sequence 1, 0, 0, 1, a, 1 drawn
from X = {0, 1, a} has empirical distribution q(0) = 13 ,
q(1) = 12 , q(a) =
1
6 . Note, for any p ∈ Pn(X ), p(x)n ∈ Z.
Furthermore T np denotes the n-symbol type set of p, or in
other words the set Xˆ ⊂ Xn containing all xn with empirical
distribution p. When necessary, we shall use pX to refer to the
probability distribution over X , that is pX(x) = Pr (X = x) .
Finally we shall use pn(xn) to mean
∏n
i=1 p(xi).
To discuss the average of certain functions of random
variables we shall use math blackboard bold font. In particular
for random variables X,Y, Z we will employ
E [X ] =
∑
x
pX(x)x,
H(X |Y ) , −
∑
x,y
pX,Y (x, y) log pX|Y (x|y),
I(X ;Y |Z) ,
∑
x,y,z
pX,Y,Z(x, y, z) log
pX,Y |Z(x, y|z)
pX|Z(x|z)pY |Z(y|z)
.
At one point in the paper it will be necessary to consider the
last equation as a random variable depending on the value of
Z, thus we make note of this now
IZ(X ;Y ) =
∑
z∈Z
1{Z = z}I(X ;Y |Z = z).
We will also speak of n-symbol sequence permutations. For
example, letting υ∗({1, 2, 3}) = {3, 1, 2}, then
υ(x1, x2, x3) = xυ∗(1), xυ∗(2), xυ∗(3) = x3, x1, x2
is a 3-symbol sequence permutation.
B. Model
We begin by describing the wiretap type I channel model
(depicted in figure 1), and then describing the differences
between it and the generalized wiretap type II (depicted in
figure 2). In order to assist in presentation, the wiretap type
I channel model here will be presented in a way to easier
draw parallels between it and the wiretap channel of type II;
it should be easy to see that this model is equivalent to the
traditional channel model.
Encoder
F (M)
Channel
t(y|x)
Channel
u(z|x, s)
Decoder
θ(Y n)
Eaves.
M Xn Y n Mˆ
Zn
Sn ∼ qn
Fig. 1. Wiretap type I
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Fig. 2. Wiretap type II
A wiretap type I channel model consists of an encoder, de-
coder and an eavesdropper. The encoder is a random function
F : M → Xn, which outputs a sequence Xn = F (M) for
message M . This n-symbol sequence passes through a pair of
communication channels to the decoder and eavesdropper who
receive Y n and Zn respectively. The communication channel
between the encoder and decoder is described by a conditional
probability distribution t ∈ P(Y|X ) where given the encoder
outputs xn the probability that the decoder receives yn is∏n
i=1 t(yi|xi). On the other hand, the communication channel
between the encoder and eavesdropper is a channel with
state described by a conditional probability distribution u ∈
P(Z|X ,S), where given the encoder outputs xn and the state
sequence is sn the probability that the eavesdropper receives
zn is
∏n
i=1 u(zi|xi, si). The state sequence is generated i.i.d.
according to q ∈ P(S), and is given the eavesdropper. The
decoder θ : Yn → M then produces the message estimate
θ(Y n). We shall refer to a wiretap type I channel of the above
form as WTC-I(t, u, q).
Definition 1. A pair (F, θ) is a (n, r, ǫ, δ)-code for the WTC-
I(t, u, q) if for M uniformly distributed on M the following
are satisfied:
• (Rate, Blocklength)
|M| = 2nr
• (Error probability)
|M|−1
∑
m∈M
Pr (θ(Y n) = m|Xn = F (m)) ≥ 1− ǫ,
• (Secrecy)
I(Zn, Sn;M) = I(Zn;M |Sn) ≤ δ.
The wiretap type II channel is similar to the wiretap channel
of type I, but now the wiretapper may choose the state Sn
subject sn ∈ T nq for a given q ∈ Pn(S). We shall refer to a
wiretap type II channel of the above form as a WTC-II(t, u, q).
Definition 2. A pair (F, θ) is a (n, r, ǫ, δ)-code for the WTC-
II (t, u, q) if for M uniformly distributed on M the following
are satisfied:
• (Rate, Blocklength)
|M| = 2nr
,
• (Error probability)
|M|−1
∑
m∈M
Pr (θ(Y n) = m|Xn = F (m)) ≥ 1− ǫ,
• (Secrecy)
max
sn∈T nq
I(Zn;M |Sn = sn) ≤ δ.
III. RESULTS
Our goal will be to start with codes designed for a WTC-
I(t, u, q) and apply them to WTC-II(t, u, q), without much loss
in the measure of the operational parameters. Because of this,
it is important to note that given a fixed channel state sequence,
a WTC-I(t, u, q) and WTC-II(t, u, q) are equivalent.
Thus, in order to apply the WTC-I codes we have to negate
the advantage introduced by the eavesdropper’s channel state
choice. Namely, we have to ensure that the wiretap channel
type I code can hold for every possible channel state. Our code
transformation will accomplish this by permuting the order in
which the symbols are transmitted, and sending information
about the chosen permutation with a unique “header” code1.
The eavesdropper, whose choice of state sequence is fixed and
independent of the encoder’s output, will therefore not know
a priori which state is being applied to which symbol.
Convention 3. It will be necessary to reference sub-sequences
of the output of a permutation. To reference the n(j − 1) + 1
through nj-th symbols of υ−1w (y
nℓ) would have us writing
υ−1w (y
nℓ)njn(j−1)+1. We feel that this unacceptable notation
since we will only need to consider a very limited number
of such sub-sequences. As an alternative we write
υ−1w,j(y
nℓ) = υ−1w (y
nℓ)njn(j−1)+1.
Definition 4. Given codes
(F, θ), F :M → Xn, θ : Yn →M
(G,ϕ), G :M∗ → X κ, ϕ : Yκ →M∗
1In practice this code will only need to transmit O(logn) bits of infor-
mation. We will implicitly assume the existence of such codes, and take
for granted that the number of symbols needed to transmit this information
reliably is o(n).
and a set of nℓ-symbol sequence permutations, V = {υi}|M|
∗
i=1 ,
the ℓ-concatenate and permute code of (F, θ) with header
(G,ϕ) and permutations V is defined as
F
(ℓ)
G,V(m
ℓ) = [υW (F (m1), F (m2), . . . , F (mℓ)) , G(W )]
θ
(ℓ)
ϕ,V
(
ynℓ+κ
)
=
[
θ
(
υ−1
ϕ(ynℓ+κnℓ+1 ),1
(ynℓ)
)
, . . . , θ
(
υ−1
ϕ(ynℓ+κnℓ+1 ),ℓ
(ynℓ)
)]
where W is a uniform random variable over M∗.
The transformed encoder can be viewed first as concatenat-
ing the output of ℓ uses of the original encoder F , to form a
nℓ-symbol sequence. Next a permutation, chosen at random
from the set V = {υi}|M
∗|
i=1 , is applied to the nℓ-symbol
sequence. Finally the encoder uses G to encode the value of
the chosen permutation, and appends the encoded sequence
to the nℓ-symbol sequence. At the other end, the transformed
decoder first uses ϕ to decode the header which contains the
information of which permutation was chosen. The decoder
then applies the inverse permutation to the first nℓ symbols,
which in the absence of decoding error for the header, results
in every consecutive non-overlapping sequence of n symbols
corresponding to a different use of the original code. Finally,
the original decoder is applied to each consecutive block of
n-symbols, in turn decoding each mj , j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
Before moving into the technical lemmas which make the
main theorem possible, we wish to briefly discuss why the
above aspects were necessary. Of major importance is the
permutation of the encoder outputs which suppresses the
eavesdropper’s ability to choose a specific state sequence to
attack the code. To see this, consider the case where there
exists only a small set of state sequences which are truly
detrimental to the original code. Permuting the original code
will also permute the set of detrimental state sequences,
and with only a small probability will two randomly chosen
permutations share a detrimental state sequence. Thus by
choosing from a large number of possible permutations, it is
unlikely that any state sequence chosen by the eavesdropper
will be detrimental for the independently chosen permutation.
Even if the eavesdropper deciphers the header, thus learning
which permutation was chosen, by then it is too late as it is
likely there chosen state seqnece did not leak information.
Thus the need for the permutation, but why the need to
concatenate the codes? Consider this: while a (n, r, ǫ, δ) code
for the WTC-I(t, u, q) does provide
I(Zn, Sn;M) = I(Zn;M |Sn) ≤ δ,
it does not necessarily provide
I(Zn;M |Sn, Sn ∈ T nq ) ≤ δ.
In fact, naively, it may be possible to have a code where
I(Zn;M |Sn) = o(1) and I(Zn;M |Sn, Sn ∈ T nq ) = n|Z|, as
long as I(Zn;M |Sn, Sn ∈ T nq˜ ) = 0, for all q˜ ∈ Pn(S)−{q}.
This is problematic because in the WTC-II(t, u, q) the eaves-
dropper has a fixed empirical distribution for the channel
state sequence. By concatenating multiple uses of the code
together, and then applying permutations, the distribution of
state symbols applied to each use of the code will appear closer
to i.i.d. instead of chosen from a type set.
We now establish a series of technical lemmas relating
the secrecy of the transformed code to the original, and the
probability of a given state sequence being selected for the
constituent codes.
Convention 5. Mˆ, Zˆn, and Sˆn will be used to denote the
message, eavesdropper’s observation and the state sequence,
respectively, for the original code, (F, θ), sent over a WTC-
I(t, u, q). WhileM ℓ, Znℓ+κ, and Snℓ+κ will be used to denote
the message, eavesdropper’s observation and eavesdropper’s
chosen state sequence when sent using the transformed code,
(F
(ℓ)
G,V , θ
(ℓ)
ϕ,V), over a WTC-II(t, u, q).
Lemma 6. Let (F, θ) and (G,ϕ) be a (n, r, ǫf , δ) and
(κ, ψ, ǫg,∞) code, respectively, for a WTC-I(t, u, q), and
let V = {υi}2κψi=1 be a collection of nℓ-symbol sequence
permutations. Then for WTC-II(t, u, q) and (F
(ℓ)
G,V , θ
(ℓ)
ϕ,V)-code,
I(Znℓ+κ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ)
≤
ℓ∑
j=1
2κψ∑
w=1
I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = υ−1w,j(snℓ))2−κψ. (1)
For proof see Appendix A.
We will also need to be able to determine the probability
of a particular state sequence subject to a randomly chosen
permutation.
Lemma 7. Let Υ be uniform over the set of all n-symbol
sequence permutations, and let sn ∈ T nq , q ∈ Pn(S).
Pr (Υ(sn) = sˆn) =
{
qn(sˆn)
qn(T nq )
if sˆn ∈ T nq
0 o.w.
.
For proof see Appendix B.
Lemma 8. Let n, ℓ ∈ Z+, and let q ∈ Pnℓ(S), where
mins∈S q(s) ≥ 4
√
ln(n(ℓ−1))
n(ℓ−1) .
qnℓ
({
snℓ : sn = sˆn
} ∩ T nℓq )
qnℓ(T nℓq )
≤ µqn(sˆn)
where
µ =
√
2e−
1
4
13
11
(
2πℓ
ℓ− 1
) |S|
2
.
For proof see Appendix C.
Theorem 9. Fix any λ > 0, ℓ ∈ Z+ and let (F, θ) and
(G,ϕ) be a (n, r, ǫf , δ) and (κ, ψ, ǫg,∞) code, respectively,
for a WTC-I(t, u, q) where q ∈ Pnℓ+κ(S), mins∈S q(s) ≥
4
√
ln(n(ℓ−1))
n(ℓ−1) +
κ
nℓ . Given independent random variables
{Υi}2κψi=1 uniformly distributed over the set of nℓ-symbol
sequence permutations,
Pr
(
Υ2
κψ
/∈ V∗
)
< ℓ|S|nℓ exp
(
−2κψ+1
(
λ
n|Z|
)2)
,
where V∗ is the collection of V = {υi}2κψi=1 such that
(F
(ℓ)
G,V , θ
(ℓ)
ϕ,V) is a(
nℓ+ κ, r
[
1− κ
nℓ+ κ
]
, ℓǫf + ǫg, ℓ
[
µeκ/ℓδ + λ
])
WTC-II(t, u, q) code, where µ is from Lemma 8.
Remark 10. Notice that ψ is a coding rate and should be
close to the capacity of the channel for large values of κ.
Thus setting λ = n−2, choosing n8|Z|2/2 permutations and
concatenating
ℓ =
−1 + log2(n4|Z|2)− log2 2λ2
ψ
codes yields a
≈ (nℓ, r, ǫfℓ, (δ + n−2)ℓ)WTC-II code
with probability ≈ 1 − e−n2 . Therefore, for2 δ ≥ n−2 and
small ǫf , the new code produced for the WTC-II sends nearly
the same amount of information, in nearly the same number
of symbols, with nearly the same error probability, and nearly
the same information leakage as ℓ uses of the original code
would over the WTC-I.
Remark 11. For future work we hope to derive an approxi-
mation lemma, similar to that used in [9], thus eliminating the
need for the bound on q(s).
Proof: Clearly, regardless of chosen V , (F (ℓ)G,V , θ(ℓ)ϕ,V) will
use nℓ+ κ symbols, to transmit a message from a set of size
|M|ℓ = 2ℓnr yielding rate
nℓr
nℓ+ κ
=
(
1− κ
nℓ+ κ
)
r. (2)
Furthermore regardless of permutations chosen (since each is
invertible) the probability of error must be less than ǫg + ℓǫf
by the union bound, accounting for the single use of (G,ϕ)
(probability of error ǫg) and the ℓ uses of (F, θ) (probability
of error ǫf ).
What remains is to calculate the secrecy measure. For now
fix Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ, and observe that if Υ2
κψ
= {υ}2κψi=1 then
I(Znℓ+κ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ)
≤
ℓ∑
j=1
2κψ∑
w=1
I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = υ−1w,j(snℓ))2−κψ (3)
by Lemma 6.
Set Vw,j = IΥw
(
Zˆn; Mˆ
∣∣∣Sˆn = Υ−1w,j(snℓ)) , and note for
later that given a fixed j the random variables {Vw,j}2κψw=1
are independent since {Υw}2κψw=1 are independent and Vw,j
is a deterministic function of Υw. With this notation, the
probability of choosing a set of permutations such that
2This is the minimum value of δ needed to assure a semantic security sub
code, see [10].
I(Znℓ+κ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ) > ℓeκ/ℓµδ + ℓλ is bounded
by
Pr

 ℓ∑
j=1
2κψ∑
w=1
Vw,j2
−κψ ≥ ℓeκ/ℓµδ + ℓλ


≤
ℓ∑
j=1
Pr

 2κψ∑
w=1
Vw,j2
−κψ ≥ eκ/ℓµδ + λ

 . (4)
Hence, if
E

 2κψ∑
w=1
2−κψVw,j

 ≤ eκ/ℓµδ, (5)
which we shall return to later, then
Pr

 ℓ∑
j=1
2κψ∑
w=1
Vw,j2
−κψ ≥ ℓeκ/ℓµδ + ℓλ


≤
ℓ∑
j=1
Pr

 2κψ∑
w=1
Vw,j2
−κψ − E

 2κψ∑
w=1
2−κψVw,j

 ≥ λ

 (6)
≤ ℓ exp
(
−2κψ+1
(
λ
n|Z|
)2)
(7)
where (7) follows from Hoeffding’s inequality3. Since the
choice of snℓ+κ was arbitrary, the probability of selecting a
set of permutations such that
max
snℓ+κ∈T nℓ+ηq
I(Znℓ+κ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ) > ℓeκ/ℓµδ + ℓλ
must be less than
ℓ|S|nℓ+κ exp
(
−2κψ+1
(
λ
n|Z|
)2)
by Equation (7) combined with the union bound to account
for all possible state sequence choices.
To finish the proof we return to show Equation (5). Begin
by writing the LHS of Equation (5) as∑
sˆn
Pr
(
Υ−1w,j(s
nℓ) = sˆn
)
I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = sˆn) (8)
which can be done since Vw,j = IΥw (Zˆ
n; Mˆ |Sˆn =
Υ−1w,j(s
nℓ)), for some arbitrary snℓ. Now it is clear that (8)
equals
∑
sˆn
q˜nℓ({snℓ : sn = sˆn} ∩ T nℓq˜ )
q˜nℓ(T nℓq )
I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = sˆn), (9)
where q˜ is the empirical distribution of snℓ, by Lemma 7. But
the difference between the empirical distributions of snℓ+κ and
snℓ must be small. In fact each s ∈ S occurs q(s)(nℓ+κ) times
in snℓ+κ, and hence can occur in snℓ at most q(s)(nℓ + κ)
3Note that 0 ≤ Vw,j ≤ n|Z| by the non-negativity of mutual information
and that IΥw
(
Zˆn; Mˆ
∣∣∣Sˆn = Υ−1w,j(snℓ)
)
≤ H(Zˆn|Sˆn = Υ−1w,j(s
nℓ)) ≤
n|Z|.
times and at least q(s)(nℓ+ κ)− κ times. Therefore we have
that
q˜(s) ≤ q(s)(nℓ + κ)
nℓ
or
q˜(s)
q(s)
≤ 1 + κ
nℓ
, (10)
which will be of use shortly, and
q˜(s) ≥ q(s)(nℓ + κ)− κ
nℓ
> q(s)− κ
nℓ
≥ 4
√
ln(n(ℓ − 1))
n(ℓ− 1)
(11)
by the assumptions on q in the theorem statement. We can
upper bound Equation (9) with∑
sˆn
µq˜n(sˆn)I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = sˆn), (12)
using Lemma 8, in light of Equation (11). Furthermore, using
Equation (10) it follows that
q˜n(sˆn) ≤ qn(sˆn)
(
1 +
κ
nℓ
)n
≤ qn(sˆn)eκ/ℓ. (13)
Combining Equations (12) and (13) yields
µeκ/ℓ
∑
sˆn
qn(sˆn)I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = sˆn) (14)
as an upper bound of E
[∑2κψ
w=1 2
−κψVw,j
]
. Finally, observe
that Sˆn is distributed qn in the WTC-I(t, u, q), and thus
µeκ/ℓ
∑
sˆn
qn(sˆn)I(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = sˆn) = µeκ/ℓI(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn)
≤ µeκ/ℓδ, (15)
proving Equation (5).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof: This Lemma is derived as follows
I(Znℓ+κ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ)
≤ I(Znℓ+κ,W ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ) (16)
= I(Znℓ;M ℓ|Snℓ = snℓ+κ,W ) (17)
=
2κψ∑
w=1
2−κψI(Znℓ;M ℓ|Snℓ = snℓ,W = w) (18)
=
2κψ∑
w=1
ℓ∑
j=1
2−κψI(Zˆn; Mˆ |Sˆn = v−1w,j(snℓ)) (19)
where (17) is because4 I(W ;M ℓ|Snℓ+κ = snℓ+κ) = 0 while
the last κ symbols are independent given header information
W , and (19) is because each use of the code is independent
and the channel uses are independent given the state sequence
which for the j-th code corresponds to the n(j−1)+1 through
nj-th symbols of the inverse permutation of the channel state
sequence.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Proof: Let an, bn, cn be (not necessarily distinct) se-
quences of type q ∈ Pn(S). Suppose in hopes of a con-
tradiction that there existed more permutations in U∗(bn) ,
{υ : υ(an) = bn} than in U∗(cn). Now, clearly, there exists
at least one permutation υ˜ such that υ˜(bn) = cn. Further-
more υ˜(υ(an)) = cn for all υ ∈ U∗(bn). But this implies
υ˜(U∗(bn)) ⊆ U∗(cn) and thus |U∗(bn)| ≤ |U∗(cn)| since all
permutations are invertible functions. This is a contradiction,
and therefore |U∗(bn)| is equal for all bn ∈ T nq .
The above contradiction implies that if Υ is uniformly
chosen from the set of all permutations then
Pr (Υ(an) = bn) =
1
|T nq |
=
qn(bn)
qn(T nq )
.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Proof:
Begin by observing that if the empirical distribution of sˆn
is q˜, then{
snℓ : sn = sˆn
} ∩ T nℓq = {snℓ : sn = sˆn, snℓn+1 ∈ T nℓqˆ } ,
(20)
where qˆ ∈ P(S) is the distribution such that
qˆ
nℓ− n
nℓ
+ q˜
n
nℓ
= qˆ
ℓ− 1
ℓ
+ q˜
1
ℓ
= q. (21)
4Recall that W,Mℓ and Sn are chosen independently.
From Equation (20) that
qnℓ
({
snℓ : sn = sˆn
} ∩ T nℓq )
qnℓ(T nℓq )
=
qn(sˆn)qn(ℓ−1)(T n(ℓ−1)qˆ )
qnℓ(T nℓq )
(22)
directly follows due to qn being a product measure. Notice
now that the RHS of Equation (22) takes the form of qn(sˆn)
multiplied qn(ℓ−1)(T n(ℓ−1)qˆ )/qnℓ(T nℓq ), and this multiplier can
be computed by calculating the probabilities of specific types.
As a first attempt it is tempting to use the traditional bounds
(such as [11, Lemma 2.6], (k+1)−|S|2−kD(qˆ||q) ≤ qk(T kqˆ ) ≤
2−kD(qˆ||q)), but they are far too loose and result in a multiplier
which is polynomial with k. Instead applying the stricter
bounds derived from Stirling’s approximation, namely
qk(T kqˆ ) = (1 + ζ)
1
√
2πk
|S|−1
√∏|S|
i=1 qˆ(i)
2−kD(qˆ||q), (23)
where |ζ| ≤ 112k results in
qn(ℓ−1)(T n(ℓ−1)qˆ )
qnℓ(T nℓq )
≤ ζˆ
∏
i∈Sˆ
(√
q(i)
qˆ(i)
) ∏
i∈S−Sˆ
(√
n(ℓ− 1)q(i)
)
2−n(ℓ−1)D(qˆ||q),
(24)
where Sˆ ⊂ S are the indices i for which qˆ(i) 6= 0, and
ζˆ =
1 + 112n(ℓ−1)
1− 112nℓ
√
2π
|S|−|Sˆ|
√
ℓ
ℓ− 1
|S|−1
≤ 13
11
(
2πℓ
ℓ− 1
) |S|
2
.
Equation (24) in turn has upper bound
ζˆ
∏
i∈Sˆ
(√
q(i)
q(i)−∆(i)
) ∏
i∈S−Sˆ
(√
q(i)n(ℓ− 1)
)
· e−n(ℓ−1)2 (
∑
i∈S |∆(i)|)
2
≤ ζˆ
∏
i∈Sˆ
(√
q(i)
q(i)−∆(i)
) ∏
i∈S−Sˆ
(√
q(i)n(ℓ − 1)
)
· e−n(ℓ−1)2
∑
i∈S |∆(i)|
2
, (25)
where ∆(i) = q(i) − qˆ(i), due to an application of Pinsker’s
inequality. The advantage of Equation (25) is that it can be
written
ζˆ
∏
i∈S
τi(∆(i)), (26)
where
τi(x) ,


e−
n(ℓ−1)
2 x
2
√
q(i)
q(i)−x if i ∈ Sˆ
and x ∈
(
−∞, q(i)− 1n(ℓ−1)
]
e−
n(ℓ−1)
2 q
2(i)
√
q(i)n(ℓ− 1) if i ∈ S − Sˆ
0 o.w.
,
(27)
and τi(x) has at most two local maximums for each i. Indeed,
if i ∈ S − Sˆ then the maximum is
e−
n(ℓ−1)
2 q
2(i)
√
q(i)n(ℓ− 1). (28)
On the other hand if i ∈ Sˆ, then one of the maximums of
τi(x) occurs at
x = q(i)− 1
n(ℓ− 1) , (29)
and the other at5
x =
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 2
q2(i)n(ℓ − 1)
)
q(i), (30)
which can be obtained, of course, by setting the derivative of
Equation (27) to zero, and solving6 for x, and then checking
for asymptotes and boundary points. Evaluating τi, for i ∈ Sˆ,
at these local maximums gives values of
e−
n(ℓ−1)
2 (q(i)−
1
n(ℓ−1))
2√
q(i)n(ℓ − 1) (31)
and
e
−n(ℓ−1)8
(
q(i)−
√
q2(i)− 2
n(ℓ−1)
)2
·
√√√√q(i)n(ℓ− 1)
(
q(i)−
√
q2(i)− 2
n(ℓ− 1)
)
(32)
respectively. For these maximums, it is easy to see that for
equal values of q(i) that the maximum in (28) is less than the
maximum in (31) since we have assumed
q(s) > 4
√
ln(n(ℓ− 1))
n(ℓ − 1)
for all s ∈ S. Furthermore, from basic calculus we see that
Equation (31) is maximized when q(i) is as small as possible.
Hence, we can obtain an upper bound on Equations (28)
and (31) as follows
e−
n(ℓ−1)
2 (q(i)−
1
n(ℓ−1) )
2√
q(i)n(ℓ− 1)
≤ e−
n(ℓ−1)
2
(
4
√
ln(n(ℓ−1))
n(ℓ−1)
− 1
n(ℓ−1)
)2
2 (n(ℓ− 1) ln [n(ℓ − 1)]) 14
(33)
≤ e−
n(ℓ−1)
2
(
2
√
ln(n(ℓ−1))
n(ℓ−1)
)2
2 (n(ℓ− 1) ln [n(ℓ− 1)]) 14 (34)
= 2
(
ln [n(ℓ− 1)]
(n (ℓ− 1))7
) 1
4
< 1, (35)
for all n(ℓ − 1) ≥ 2. On the other hand q(s) =
√
2
n(ℓ−1)
maximizes Equation (32), which once again follows from
basic calculus. Evaluating (32) at q(s) =
√
2
n(ℓ−1) , amazingly,
yields
√
2e−
1
4 .
5Only valid if q2(i)n(ℓ − 1) > 2.
6There is also a minimum at
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
1− 2
q(i)2n(ℓ−1)
)
q(i).
